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Abstract 
 
This study assesses dynamics of openness and finance in Africa by integrating financial 
development dynamics of depth, activity and size in the assessment of how financial, trade, 
institutional, political and other openness policies (of second generation structural and 
institutional reforms) have affected financial development. The empirical evidence is based 
on Generalized Method of Moments with data from 28 African countries for the period 1996-
2010. The following findings are established.  (i) While the de jure (KAOPEN) indicator of 
financial openness improves financial depth, the de facto (FDI) measurement decreases it, 
with the effect of the latter measure positive on financial size. (ii) Whereas trade openness 
improves financial depth, its effect on financial activity and size is negative. (iii) Institutional 
openness has a positive effect on financial dynamics of depth and activity, while its effect on 
financial size is negative. (iv) Political openness and economic freedom are detrimental to 
financial depth and activity. Justifications for these nexuses are discussed.    
 
JEL Classification: E50; G20; O16; O17; O55 
Keywords: Banking; Trade; Institutions; Politics; Africa 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 Mechanisms that have facilitated the recent financial crisis and global economic 
meltdown have resurfaced concerns (in developing countries) about the positive ambitions of 
globalization and its implications for growth and volatility (Asongu, 2014a; Kumi et al., 
2017). In fact the crises have brought renewed interest in the heated debate on the advantages 
of openness policies and their implications for financial development. The issue is particularly 
tensed in developing countries because according to theoretical postulation, the benefits of 
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liberalization (especially financial openness) are expected to be higher in these countries 
(Kose et al., 2011). Accordingly, from a theoretical perspective openness should ease the 
efficient allocation of resources, promote international risk-sharing, and facilitate institutional 
and political reforms, inter alia. For instance, as many emerging markets and developing 
economies (which had to grapple with surges in capital flows earlier in the last decade) are 
now experiencing a sharp reversal of the flows, many analysts are consistent with the position 
that the global financial crisis has dramatically unraveled the downsides of openness (Price  & 
Elu, 2014; Batuo & Asongu, 2015; Motelle &  Biekpe, 2015).  
 The course of the current pattern on openness policies was set in the 1980s with 
growing cross border financial flows among industrial countries as well as among developing 
economies. This was facilitated by the liberalization of capital controls in many of these 
countries because it was highly anticipated that increased cross-border flows would bring 
more benefits in terms of better capital allocation and improved possibilities of international 
risk sharing. Accordingly, many economic analysts and policy makers have suggested that 
these benefits ought to be high for developing countries that have more volatile income 
growth and relatively scarce capital (Kose et al., 2006). The narrative on positive effects of 
openness policies was seriously tarnished by a spade of currency and financial crises in the 
late 1980s and 1990s. Whereas the debate over the positive gains from trade openness has led 
to some form of consensus among academics and practitioners (Kose et al., 2006), that on 
other openness policies (capital, political and institutional) has intensified and become even 
more polarized (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004; Keefer, 2007;  Back & Hadenius, 
2008).  
  Motivated by the goal of giving impetus to economic growth and improving 
financial development, many African countries embarked on a chain of structural and policy 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992). The first generation of reforms 
consisted of policies that consisted of inter alia: reducing direct government intervention in 
bank credit decisions, abolishing explicit control on the pricing and allocation of credit, 
relaxing of control on international capital movements and, allowing of interests rates to be 
market- determined. The second generation of reforms targeted structural and institutional 
constraints, notably: improvements in the legal, regulatory, supervisory and institutional 
environments, restoration of bank soundness and rehabilitation of financial infrastructure 
(Batuo et al., 2010). Unfortunately, while a substantial bulk of the literature has assessed 
financial gains of the reforms (Cho, 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & Kupukile, 2010), not 
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all the dimensions identified by the Financial Development and Structure Database  (FDSD) 
of the World Bank (WB) have been considered (Batuo & Asongu, 2015)1. 
 In the light of the above, this study has a twofold contribution to the literature. First, it 
complements existing literature by employing the missing financial development dimensions 
identified by the FDSD of the WB. Second, by adopting a plethora of openness indicators 
(financial, trade, institutional, political…etc), we present a more dynamic picture of the 
linkages between openness policies and financial development. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical and empirical literature is 
covered in Section 2.  Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis 
and discussion of results are presented in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Openness, financial development and economic Development: theory and evidence  
There is a substantial bulk of theoretical and empirical literature that has investigated 
linkages between openness, financial progress and economic development. Consistent with 
Batuo and Asongu (2015), the principal fundamental underlying financial liberalization is 
based on a hypothetical connection between financial development and economic prosperity. 
Accordingly, it is theoretically anticipated that openness policies will enhance financial 
development that will eventually lead to a reduction in income inequality and poverty 
(Odhiambo, 2009, 2011, 2010a, 2010b, 2013). Seminal contributions on the imperative of 
openness for financial development (and ultimately economic growth and poverty reduction) 
can be traced to the contributions of Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973) who advocated that 
openness policies would stifle repression (i.e. financial, economic, political and institutional) 
which was a cause of poor growth performance from developing countries. In essence, the 
theoretical underpinning assumes that more openness policies will increase both domestic and 
foreign investments that are necessary for domestic financial development, employment, 
economic growth, public income (needed for social amenities) and reduction of poverty and 
inequality by means of employment and redistributive public spending. The bulk of literature 
on the link between the underlying nexuses has been premised on the discussed theoretical 
underpinning (see Reinhart & Loannis, 2008; Galbis, 1993; Galor & Zeira, 1993; Mckinnon 
& Pill, 1999; Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Demirguc-kunt & Detragiache, 2000; Hellmann et 
al., 2000; Batuo et al., 2010; Assefa & Mollick, 2016;  Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2016).  In what 
                                                 
1
 Also see the bulk of recent literature on financial development that has failed to incorporate various dimensions 
of the FDSD of the World Bank (Fowowe, 2014: Asongu, 2012, 2015; Daniel, 2017; Chikalipah, 2017; Wale & 
Makina, 2017; Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Bocher et al., 2017; Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Iyke 
& Odhiambo, 2017).  
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follows, we articulate the specific features  openness notably: financial liberalisation, trade 
liberalisation and institutional/political liberalisation.  The specifics are substantiated in 
chronological order.   
 First, with regard to financial openness, the decision on whether to move to an open 
economic account (from a closed economic account) has been the subject of much heated 
debated in the literature (see Asongu, 2017). Consistent with Asongu and De Moor (2017), 
there are two main positions on the importance of capital account openness when it comes to 
understanding its implications for developing countries. (i) The first position on “allocation 
efficiency” fundamentally builds on the positive claims on efficient allocation of capital 
advocated by the neoclassical growth model (Solow, 1956). In the light of this model, the 
efficient allocation of international resources is facilitated by capital account liberalization.  
Accordingly, the process of capital account liberalization enables the flow of capital resources 
(which are abundant in rich countries and where the return of capital is low) to capital-scarce 
poor countries (which are rich in labour and where the return of capital is high). The 
documented positive externalities from capital account openness include, inter alia: decreased 
cost of capital, enhanced investment and inclusive growth that are essential in improving 
living standards (Fischer, 1998; Obstfeld, 1998; Summers, 2000).  It is therefore on the bases 
of these theoretical advantages that over the past three decades, many developing nations have 
justified the need to open their capital accounts.  
(ii) The second position in the literature simply acknowledges the justification for allocation 
efficiency as a disguised attempt to extend the rewards from international trade in 
commodities to international trade in assets.  With respect to this strand, the assumption of 
allocation efficiency can withstand scrutiny only and only if developing countries (with the 
exception of free capital movements) do not experience macroeconomic volatilities. In the 
light of the fact that volatilities and distortions were experienced by developing countries 
during the recent global financial crises, proponents in this strand have advocated that the 
practical realities of capital account liberalization do not converge with the corresponding 
hypothetical advantages  advanced by the contending strand (see Rodrik, 1998; Rodrik & 
Subramanian, 2009). Rodrik (1998) with a provocative title (i.e. “Who Needs Capital-
Account Convertibility?”) has concluded that there is no apparent relationship connecting 
capital account openness to the rate of investment and economic prosperity in developing 
countries. He goes on further to infer that the cost of financial globalization is obviously 
dismal for developing countries whereas the benefits from capital account liberalization are 
not easy to establish. Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) conclude that with the recent financial 
6 
 
crises, doubts have increasingly been raised about the rewards of financial engineering. These 
narratives should be balanced with recent evidence that financial globalization uncertainty is 
favorable to domestic financial development (see Asongu et al., 2017). 
 Second, the dimension of trade openness is fundamentally traceable to the 
underpinnings of the Hecksher-Ohlin (HO) theory which predicts that openness to trade will 
engender more specialisation and rise in income levels for participating countries, owing to 
positive externalities from comparative advantages, notably: enhanced rational global 
allocation of production (Batuo & Asongu, 2015). According to the narrative, with trade 
liberalisation, countries will switch production to efficient labour-intensive exports, from 
inefficient capital-intensive import substitutes. In spite of these theoretical positions, the 
empirical literature on the relevance of trade openness on development outcomes has 
documented results that run counter to the expected theoretical benefits (Wood, 1995; 
Bourguignon & Morrison, 1998; Alarcon &  McKinley, 1998; Savvides; 1998).  
Third, there are hypothetical time and level benefits associated with institutional and 
political liberalisations. (i) The time and level hypothetical benefits of political and 
institutional openness have been tested independently to examine the existence of nonlinear 
nexuses. Concerning the level hypothesis, it has been found using continuous measures of 
political regimes that development is highest in strongly democratic states, medium in 
strongly authoritarian regimes and least in states that are partially democratized. From varying 
empirical specifications, the level oriented nonlinearity has been qualified as either U-shaped 
(Montinola & Jackman, 2002), S-shaped (Sung, 2004), or J-shaped (Back & Hadenius, 2008). 
Consistent with the time of exposure hypothesis, Keefer (2007) has demonstrated that younger 
democracies produce worse institutions than their older counterparts2. (ii) Since developing 
countries have a more volatile output than advanced industrial countries, it has been argued 
that the former countries (which completely opened-up their capital accounts) have been more 
vulnerable to crises, relative to than their industrial counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 
2007).  
The above narratives point to the fact that the nexus between openness and 
development outcomes is still open to debate because there is no definite consensus in 
                                                 
2
 A substantial bulk of qualitative literature provides exhaustive case studies on how institutional quality 
decreases with political openness. This is the case with many developing countries in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972; 
Asongu, 2014b), Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972), India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977). It is also the case 
of post-communist Russia (Varsee, 1997) and many Latin American countries after waves of democratization 
(Weyland, 1998). This contradictory nexus between democracy and institutional quality has been confirmed in 
quantitative studies (Harris-White & White, 1996; Sung, 2004). 
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scholarly and policy circles. In what follows, we contribute to this debate by employing a 
multitude of openness and financial development variables.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
We investigate a sample of 28 African countries with annual data from African 
Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank, Chinn and Ito (2002), Gwartney et al. 
(2011) and the FDSD for the period 1996 to 2010. Limitations to the number of countries and 
periodicity of analysis have a twofold justification: (i) constraints in data availability on 
institutional quality and (ii) the motivation of capturing the effects of second generation 
financial reforms that targeted institutional and structural constraints. 
In line with recent financial development literature (Asongu, 2016), we use financial 
dynamics of depth, activity and size. We provide three justifications for these financial 
measures in appreciating second generation reforms. First, the reforms were also intended to 
promote the creation of bank accounts so that a considerable chunk of the monetary base 
could transit via formal financial institutions (financial depth) in order to enhance monetary 
policy efficiency. Second, the reforms sought to improve financial activity by means of 
granting credit (financial activity), given the substantially documented issues of surplus 
liquidity in African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009). Third, a corollary 
of the two objectives above is the improvement of overall financial size. As presented in 
Appendix 3: financial depth is measured both from overall economic and financial system 
perspectives, financial activity is appreciated at the banking system and financial system 
levels while financial size is measured only at the financial system perspective.   
 Consistent with Batuo and Asongu (2015),  we distinguish among five types of 
openness policies: financial, trade, institutional, political and other liberalizations. First, 
financial openness is measured by: de jure capital account openness (KAPOPEN) developed 
by Chinn and Ito (2002) and de facto capital account openness (foreign direct investment: 
FDI). KAOPEN is the first principal component of four binary variables in the International 
Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER) and it takes higher values for financial regimes that are more open. We are 
motivated to add subtlety to the analysis by complementing KAOPEN with FDI because of 
the following reasons.  (i) The former may not capture the actual ebb and flow of cross- 
border capital and its effect (Aizenman et al., 2009). (ii) The private sector often circumvents 
capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory capital controls 
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(Edwards, 1999). (iii) More recently China’s de facto openness, despite its de jure closure has 
been subject to much discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 
2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009).  
Second, trade openness is measured by trade and exports. Whereas the former is the 
sum of imports and exports of commodities as a % of GDP, the latter only consists of 
commodity exports on GDP. Third, institutional openness is the first principal component of 
six good governance indicators, namely: corruption-control, government effectiveness, rule of 
law, regulation quality, political stability and voice & accountability. Fourth, political 
openness is proxied with the Democracy index. Fifth, other openness measures include: 
“freedom to trade” and economic freedom (Gwartney et al., 2011).  “Freedom to trade 
internationally” is an index denoting: taxes on international trade (international trade tax 
revenues as % of trade sector, mean tariff rate and standard deviation of tariff rates), 
regulatory trade barriers (non tariff trade barriers and compliance cost of exporting and 
importing), size of trade sector relative to expected, black market exchange rates and 
international market capital controls (“foreign ownership /investment” restrictions and capital 
controls). “Economic freedom” broadly indicates: freedom to trade internationally, legal 
structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, size of government 
(expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and, regulation of credit, labor and business.  
Consistent with Asongu (2014a), control variables include: inflation, government 
expenditure, economic prosperity (or GDP growth), human development, foreign aid and 
population growth. We expect inflation to decrease financial development while economic 
prosperity and population growth should improve it. Human development should also 
improve financial development, while the effects of government expenditure and development 
assistance are contingent on the quality of institutions. Accordingly, government expenditure 
and development assistance destined for financial sector development may be tainted with 
corrupt practices.  These control variables are consistent with recent financial development 
literature (Banya, R. & Biekpe, 2017; Biekpe, 2011; Osabuohein & Efobi, 2013; Owosu & 
Odhiambo, 2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b; Adjasi & Biekpe, 2006; Gossel & 
Biekpe, 2014). 
The summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (depicting 
nexuses among key variables used in the study) and variables’ definitions are presented in the 
appendices. The “summary statistics” (see Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel 
regressions shows that there is quite some variation in the data utilized so that one should be 
confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The purpose of the correlation 
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matrix (which is available upon request) is to mitigate issues resulting from multicollinearity. 
From an initial assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any 
disturbing issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated.  Appendix 2 shows the 
definitions and corresponding sources of the variables. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Owing to the substantially high correlation among government quality indicators, it is 
logical to criticize the redundancy of some information. Accordingly, we use principal 
component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of government-effectiveness, rule of law, 
regulation quality, corruption-control, voice & accountability and political stability. PCA is a 
statistical technique that is widely used to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a 
smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs) that account for most 
of the information in the original data set (Tchamyou, 2016). The criteria applied to determine 
how many common factors to retain are from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). Hence, only 
PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one are retained. As presented in Table 1 below, the first 
PC is appropriate since it has an eigenvalue of 4.705 and represents about 78.4% of 
information in the institutional indicators combined. The first PC will hence represent the 
institutional openness index (Instidex). 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Institutional Index (Instidex) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 V & A R.L R.Q G.E PS CC    
First  P.C 0.369 0.435 0.412 0.425 0.388 0.416 0.784 0.784 4.705 
Second  P.C -0.690 0.103 0.258 0.436 -0.453 0.227 0.083 0.867 0.499 
Third P.C -0.591 0.187 -0.299 -0.051 0.724 0.002 0.054 0.922 0.327 
P.C: Principal Component. V& A: Voice & Accountability. R.L: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. G.E: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. 
 
4.2.2 Estimation technique  
Dynamic panel data estimation has a number of advantages and one principal 
downside in comparison to cross-country analysis (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008). On the 
positive side: (i) it makes use of both time-series and cross sectional variations in the data 
and; (ii) in cross-country regressions, the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the 
error term such that correlations between the error term and the exogenous variables results in 
biased estimated coefficients. Moreover, in cross-country regressions, if the lagged 
endogenous variable is included among the explanatory variables, the country-specific effect 
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is certainly correlated with the regressors. A measure of controlling for the presence of the 
unobserved country-specific effect is to take the first difference the regression equation in 
order to eliminate the country-specific effect and then use instrumental variables to control for 
endogeneity. Hence, tackling the endogeneity concern is another positive side of dynamic 
panel data analysis. Uncontrolled endogeneity can substantially bias estimates and lead to 
unhealthy policy recommendations due to misleading inferences. The issue of endogeneity is 
addressed by a dynamic panel data analysis with the use of lagged values of exogenous 
variables as instruments.  
On the other hand, the main disadvantage of a dynamic panel data analysis is the use 
of data  averages or shorter time spans. Consequently, the estimated results depict short-term 
effects and not long-run impacts, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and 
discussing estimated results. The redeeming feature however is that, the use of average data 
mitigates short-run disturbances that may loom substantially large. For robustness purposes 
we use both two-year and three-year non overlapping intervals (NOI).  
 The dynamic panel regression model is as follows: 
tititiytititititititi WOPITFFDFD ,,,6,5,4,3,21,10,   
       (1)             
 where ‘t’ stands for the period and ‘i’ represents a country. FD is financial 
development; F , financial openness (KAOPEN and FDI); T , trade openness (trade and 
exports); I , institutional openness (Instidex); P , political openness (democracy) and O , 
other openness indicators (economic freedom and freedom to trade).  tiW ,  is a vector of 
control variables (inflation, human development, economic prosperity, government 
expenditure, foreign aid and population growth)3 with 136  y  ,  i  is a country-specific 
effect,  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti ,  an error term.  
 The estimated coefficients from Eq. (1) will be unbiased if and only if the explaining 
variables exhibit strict exogeneity. However, this is unfortunately not the case for the 
following reasons. First, while the exogenous variables may have a substantial effect on 
financial development, the reverse effect could also be applicable. Second, the regressors can 
be correlated with the error term. Third, country- and time-specific effects are likely to also be 
correlated with other variables in the model. This is often the case when the lagged dependent 
variable is included in the equations. In order to tackle the above issues of endogenous 
regressors, a way of dealing with the problem of the correlation between the individual 
                                                 
3
 The expected signs of the control variables have already been discussed in the Data section.   
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specific-effects and the lagged dependent variables involves eliminating the individual effects 
by first differencing.  Hence, Eq. (1) becomes: 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi IITTFFFDFDFDFD 
  
 
                   
)()()()()( 1,,11,,1,,61,,5   tititttitiytitititi WWOOPP        (2) 
 Despite the elimination of country-specific effects by first differencing, Eq. (2) still 
presents an important issue. Estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is still biased 
because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent variable and 
the error term. To the address this second concern, we estimate the regression in differences 
jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation. The estimation approach uses lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the 
difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the level 
equation.  Hence, all the orthogonal conditions between the lagged dependent variables and 
the error term are exploited. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) 
and the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998), we adopt 
the latter in accordance with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4)4.  
 We use the two-step GMM in specifying the dynamic panel system estimation because 
it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. The residuals are considered to be 
homoscedastic in the one-step approach. In addition, it is important to note that the estimation 
depends on the hypothesis that the lagged values of the dependent variable and other 
independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. In the case where the error 
terms of the level equation are not autocorrelated, the first-order autocorrelation of the 
differenced residuals should be significant while the second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) 
should not be. The validity of the instruments is assessed with the Sargan over-identifying 
restrictions (OIR) test. In summary, the main arguments for using the system GMM 
estimation are that: it does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases 
of the difference estimator in small samples and, it can control for the potential endogeneity of 
all regressors. 
 
                                                 
4
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our 
empirical application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent 
empirical growth research”. Bond et al.  (2001, pp. 3-4).  
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4. Presentation and discussion of results  
4.1 Presentation of results 
The findings in Table 2 summarize results for financial depth (Table 3), financial 
activity (Table 4) and financial size (Table 5). From the summary, the following conclusions 
could be drawn. First, while the de jure (KAOPEN) measurement of financial openness 
improves financial depth, the de facto (FDI) measurement decreases it. However the effect of 
the latter measure is positive for financial size5. Second, whereas trade openness also 
improves financial depth, its effects on financial activity and size are negative. Third, 
institutional openness has a positive effect on financial dynamics of depth and activity, while 
its effect on financial size is negative. Fourth, political openness and economic freedom are 
detrimental to financial dynamics of depth and activity. Five, most of the significant control 
variables have expected signs: inflation decreases financial development, while government 
expenditure and economic prosperity increase it, for the most part (Asongu, 2011).  
 
Table 2: Summary of the results  
         
  Scope and positioning of the current paper Baseline study 
(Asongu, 2013a) 
  Financial Depth Financial Activity Fin. Size Financial Efficiency 
  
M2gdp LLgdp Pcrb Pcrbof Dbacba BcBd FcFd 
         
Financial  Kaopen + + na na na - - 
FDI na - na na + - - 
         
Trade  Trade + na na na - na na 
Exports na na - - na + na 
         
Institutional  Instidex + na na + - na + 
         
Political  Democracy - na na - na na na 
         
Freedom  of Trade  na na na na na - + 
Economic freedom  - - na - na + + 
         
M2gdp: Overall economic financial depth. LLgdp: Financial system depth. BcBd: Banking system efficiency. FcFd: 
Financial system efficiency. Pcrb: Banking system activity. Pcrbof: Financial system activity. Dbacba: Financial system size. 
Instidex: first principal component of good governance indicators. Fin: Financial.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5The two financial openness measures differ principally from the view that, KAOPEN measures de jure capital 
openness by accounting for regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions, whereas FDI is capital 
account openness. Therefore, KAOPEN tends to increase as capital markets are more liberalized. Hence, with 
FDI, KAOPEN increases. 
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Table 3: Two-step System GMM estimates for financial depth  
  Dependent variable: Financial Depth  
  Two Year Non Overlapping Intervals Three Year Non Overlapping Intervals 
  Money Supply  Liquid Liabilities  Money Supply Liquid Liabilities  
constant 0.014 0.302** 0.091 0.060 0.537*** 0.491*** -0.051 0.423*** 
 (0.136) (2.335) (0.870) (0.324) (3.873) (3.056) (-1.134) (2.866) 
Finance_1 1.180*** 0.960*** 1.073*** 1.015*** 1.099*** 1.114*** 1.184*** 1.091*** 
 (18.86) (10.44) (12.87) (5.393) (11.40) (6.835) (9.552) (8.672) 
Financial 
Openness  
Kaopen 0.001 0.018** 0.008 0.007 0.031*** 0.028** 0.002 0.027** 
 (0.359) (2.194) (1.109) (0.807) (3.176) (2.470) (0.381) (2.248) 
FDI --- -0.001 --- --- -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.003** -0.001 
  (-0.298)   (-0.263) (-0.087) (-1.974) (-0.790) 
Trade Openness  Trade  0.0004** 0.0004 --- 0.0002 0.0003 --- 0.0003 --- 
 (2.132) (1.375)  (0.835) (1.112)  (1.384)  
Exports --- --- --- --- --- 0.0005 --- 0.0007 
      (0.552)  (0.786) 
Institutional 
&Political 
Openness 
Instidex --- 0.006 0.009* 0.006 0.004 0.001 -0.0009 0.003 
  (1.001) (1.652) (0.756) (0.769) (0.198) (-0.154) (0.674) 
Demo --- -0.002 -0.002* -0.001* --- --- --- --- 
  (-1.534) (-1.764) (-1.773)     
          
Freedom of Trade  --- --- --- -0.010 --- --- --- --- 
    (-0.691)     
Economic Freedom  -0.026* -0.043** -0.016 --- -0.08*** -0.07*** --- -0.067*** 
 (-1.696) (-1.972) (-1.210)  (-3.892) (-3.248)  (-2.639) 
Inflation  -0.0006* -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.002** -0.002* -0.003** -0.003 
 (-1.795) (-2.335) (-3.333) (-1.708) (-2.128) (-1.763) (-2.175) (-0.876) 
Government Expenditure  0.0005 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.0002 -0.0009 
 (1.095) (-0.492) (1.233) (0.359) (-2.379) (-2.352) (-0.533) (-1.290) 
Human Development  --- 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.000 -0.0001 -0.0002 --- 0.0008 
  (0.171) (-1.038) (-0.060) (-0.169) (-0.338)  (0.769) 
Economic Prosperity  -0.000 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.003*** --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.004) (-0.821) (-3.690) (-2.641)     
Foreign Aid --- --- 0.0001 0.0001 --- --- 0.004* --- 
   (0.081) (0.073)   (1.813)  
Population Growth Rate 0.039*** --- 0.017 0.010 --- --- --- --- 
 (3.001)  (1.495) (0.490)     
         
Test for AR(2) errors -1.738* -0.744 -1.096 -1.085 -0.657 -0.805 -0.777 -0.717 
 [0.082] [0.456 ] [0.2727] [0.277] [0.510] [0.420] [0.436 ] [0.472 ] 
Sargan  OIR test  8.791 2.871 5.728 5.621 3.880 4.393 8.599  6.331 
 [0.998 ] [1.000 ] [1.000] [1.000] [0.867] [0.820 ] [0.377 ] [0.610] 
Wald(joint) test 1207*** 9947*** 18330*** 58577*** 1612*** 1238*** 1624*** 5543*** 
 [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.0000] [0.000] [0.000 ] [ 0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         
Number of Observations  97 75 84 84 51 51 68 53 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  
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Table 4: Two-step System GMM estimates for financial activity   
  Dependent variable: Financial Activity(A)   
  Two Year Non Overlapping Intervals  Three Year Non Overlapping Intervals 
  Banking System A  Financial System A  Banking System A Financial System A  
constant 0.064 0.0001 0.168 0.143 0.021* 0.030 0.153** 0.144** 
 (14.80) (0.001) (25.19) (1.089) (1.937) (0.542) (2.055) (1.991) 
Finance_1 1.153*** 1.059*** 1.152*** 1.106*** 1.073*** 1.066*** 1.142*** 1.139*** 
 (14.80) (6.418) (25.19) (22.94) (21.81) (23.83) (29.05) (29.59) 
 
Financial 
Openness 
Kaopen 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 0.004 0.004 
 (0.231) (0.388) (0.710) (0.355) (-0.897) (-0.659) (0.531) (0.541) 
FDI 0.001 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.001 0.0002 0.0008 0.0008 
 (0.607) (0.312) (0.321) (-0.251) (-0.597) (0.090) (0.584) (0.563) 
 
Trade Openness  
Trade  --- 0.000 --- -0.000 -0.0002 --- -0.0002 --- 
  (0.175)  (-0.072) (-1.630)  (-1.103)  
Exports -0.0004** --- -0.0003 --- --- -0.0006** --- -0.0004 
 (-2.063)  (-0.939)   (-2.077)  (-1.126) 
 
Institutional 
Openness 
Instidex 0.002 --- -0.0005 --- 0.009*** 0.011** 0.007* 0.008* 
 (0.527)  (-0.076)  (3.156) (2.335) (1.702) (1.734) 
Demo -0.001 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 -0.002* 
 (-1.157) (0.471) (-0.140) (0.288) (-2.106) (-2.189) (-1.493) (-1.742) 
          
Freedom of Trade  --- -0.0001 --- -0.025 --- --- --- --- 
  (-0.009)  (-1.132)     
Economic Freedom  -0.010 --- -0.027 --- --- 0.001 -0.024* -0.023* 
 (-0.537)  (-1.250)   (0.116) (-1.952) (-1.828) 
Inflation  -0.000 -0.0004 -0.000 0.0002 --- --- --- --- 
 (-0.095) (-1.064) (-0.001) (0.170)     
Government Expenditure  0.0002 -0.000 0.0003 0.0003 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.996) (-0.047) (0.804) (0.514)     
Human Development  --- -0.0003 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (-0.183)       
Economic Prosperity  --- -0.0006 -0.0006 --- 0.002*** --- 0.002** 0.002** 
  (-0.524) (-0.431)  (2.900)  (2.465) (2.247) 
Population Growth Rate --- 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
  (0.048)       
         
Test for AR(2) errors -1.002 -0.528 -1.042 -1.123 -0.914 -0.962 -0.258 -0.295 
 [0.315] [0.597 ] [0.297 ] [0.261 ] [0.360 ] [0.336 ] [0.796] [0.767 ] 
Sargan  OIR test  8.808 4.895  8.748 14.123 8.749 7.053 8.135 8.061 
 [0.998 ] [1.000 ] [0.998] [0.959 ] [0.363] [0.530 ] [0.420 ] [0.427] 
Wald(joint) test 1743*** 22330*** 2134*** 2893*** 1751*** 2767*** 2700*** 2551*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] 
         
Number of Observations  92 78 92 92 86 80 80 80 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  
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Table 5: Two-step System GMM estimates for financial size 
  Dependent variable: Financial Size 
  Two Year Non Overlapping Intervals  Three Year Non Overlapping Intervals  
  Financial Size Financial Size 
constant -0.004 -0.004 -0.047 -0.215 -0.144 -0.115 -0.146 0.206 
 (-0.025) (-0.026) (-0.239) (-0.717) (-0.881) (-0.726) (-0.984) (0.993) 
Finance_1 0.983*** 0.887*** 0.995*** 1.091*** 1.308*** 1.216*** 1.287*** 1.233*** 
 (5.440) (5.601) (7.237) (6.623) (6.078) (5.632) (6.253) (5.994) 
 
Financial 
Openness 
Kaopen -0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.0006 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.023 
 (-0.379) (-0.415) (0.175) (-0.068) (0.964) (1.099) (1.015) (0.959) 
FDI 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.007** 0.005 0.007** 0.004 
 (0.815) (0.456) (0.482) (0.619) (2.003) (1.627) (2.226) (0.782) 
 
Trade Openness  
Trade  -0.0002 --- 0.000 --- -0.001*** --- -0.0009*  
 (-0.267)  (0.058)  (-2.735)  (-1.732)  
Exports --- 0.0007 --- 0.0002 --- -0.001 --- -0.001 
  (0.703)  (0.636)  (-0.844)  (-1.202) 
 
Institutional 
Openness 
Instidex --- --- --- -0.006 -0.018*** -0.020* -0.021** -0.020* 
    (-0.600) (-2.653) (-1.819) (-2.201) (-1.916) 
Demo 0.001 0.001 -0.0009 -0.0008 --- 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 (0.679) (0.794) (-0.422) (-0.233)  (0.417) (0.542) (0.691) 
          
Freedom of Trade  0.008 --- 0.006 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.448)  (0.352)      
Economic Freedom  --- 0.014 --- 0.018 --- --- --- -0.052 
  (0.392)  (0.499)    (-1.382) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.0009 
   (0.242) (0.263) (-0.299) (-1.118) (-0.683) (-0.249) 
Government Expenditure  --- --- 0.002** 0.0007 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004** 0.003*** 
   (2.096) (0.452) (2.773) (2.633) (2.460) (3.082) 
Economic Prosperity  --- --- --- --- --- 0.004 0.002 0.002 
      (1.028) (0.499) (0.532) 
Foreign Aid --- --- 0.003 0.005* --- --- --- --- 
   (1.098) (1.804)     
         
Test for AR(2) errors -1.174 -0.916 -0.452 0.685 -1.097 -1.050 -1.159 -0.696 
 [0.240 ] [0.359 ] [0.650 ] [0.492] [0.272] [0.293 ] [0.246 ] [0.486 ] 
Sargan  OIR test  21.220 21.041  9.494 8.602 8.210 8.928 8.516  6.569 
 [0.680 ] [0.690] [0.997 ] [0.999 ] [0.413] [0.348 ] [0.384 ] [0.583] 
Wald(joint) test 365.7*** 293.6*** 15257*** 4453*** 158.21*** 313.8*** 182.6*** 767.11*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] 
         
Number of Observations  116 115 87 87 66 66 66 59 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses. [ ]: P-values. Instidex: Institutional index. FDI: 
Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions.  
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results  
 This section further discusses the results. First, the positive effect of the de jure 
(KAOPEN) indicator (of financial openness) throws more light on the debate over the 
Chinese financial openness policy that has recently been subject to much discussion in 
academic and policy-making circles6.  Hence,  China’s de facto openness despite its de jure 
closure may be a policy that targets less financial inefficiency and more financial activity, at 
the cost of financial depth. This trade-off is logical because financial depth may not 
necessarily reflect genuine financial development in developing countries where a great chunk 
of the monetary base does not transit through the banking sector. Hence, an increase in 
financial depth may simply reflect an extensive use of currency outside the formal banking 
sector.  
                                                 
6
 See Prasad and Wei (2007), Aizenman and Glick (2009) and Shah and Patnaik  (2009). 
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 Second, increases in trade openness activities (in terms of growing imports and 
exports) will logically have a positive effect on financial depth by increasing the velocity of 
money. However the negative incidence of exports on domestic financial activity could be 
due to the fact that a substantial portion of agricultural export activities are not formally 
financed by credit from formal financial institutions. This is the case in most rural areas where 
non-formal and informal financial channels are used to finance the production of cash crops.  
 Third, apart from a small exception (i.e. financial size), the positive effect of 
institutional openness on financial development is broadly consistent with the significant role 
of institutional adjustments for financial development in second generation openness reforms.  
Fourth, the negative effect of political openness on financial development is broadly 
consistent with Asongu (2011). The time and level hypothetical benefits of democracy 
(discussed in the introduction) have been confirmed in the literature. Asongu (2014b) has 
concluded that democracy in Africa has important effects on the degree of competition for 
public offices but less significant effects in comparison with autocracy on policies of financial 
development. This essentially because, democracies in the continent are young (time 
hypothesis) and weak (level hypothesis). Hence, in order for African democracies to reap any 
government quality benefits, once democracies are initiated, they should be accelerated to 
edge the appeals of autocracy. This African evidence is in line with broader literature on the 
level (Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004; Back & Hadenius, 2008) and ‘time of 
exposure’ (Keefer, 2007) schools of thought pertaining to the benefits of political openness 
documented in Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972), India (Wade, 1985), Turkey (Sayari, 1977), post 
communist Russia (Varsee, 1997), Latin America (Weyland, 1998) and, confirmed in a 
substantial bulk of quantitative studies (Harris-White & White, 1996; Sung, 2004).  
 Fifth, we notice that “economic freedom” is detrimental to financial development 
dynamics of depth and activity. This could be explained from the fact that the substantial 
weight of its legal structure component is inclined to facilitating financial allocation 
efficiency (financial activity/financial depth) than to improving the independent components 
of financial efficiency. 
 
5. Conclusion and future research directions  
This study has assessed dynamics of openness and finance in Africa by integrating 
financial development dynamics of depth, activity and size in the assessment of how financial, 
trade, institutional, political and other openness policies (of second generation structural and 
institutional reforms) have affected financial development. The empirical evidence is based 
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on Generalized Method of Moments with data from 28 African countries for the period 1996-
2010. The following findings have been established.  (i) While the de jure (KAOPEN) 
indicator of financial openness improves financial depth, the de facto (FDI) measurement 
decreases it, with the effect of the latter measure positive on financial size. (ii) Whereas trade 
openness improves financial depth, its effect on financial activity and size is negative. (iii) 
Institutional openness has a positive effect on financial dynamics of depth and activity, while 
its effect on financial size is negative. (iv) Political openness and economic freedom are 
detrimental to financial depth and activity. Justifications for these nexuses have been 
discussed.    
Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing how the established 
findings withstand empirical scrutiny from country-specific settings. Moreover, assessing how 
openness modulates the effect of information sharing offices on financial development is 
worthwhile. This recommendation is timely given the recent introduction of information 
sharing offices that are designed to reduce information asymmetry for more financial access 
in the continent (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Triki & Gajigo, 2014).  
 
 
 
Appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
  
     
Financial Depth  Money Supply (M2) 0.322 0.219 0.076 1.141 360 
Liquidity Liabilities (Fdgdp) 0.260 0.207 0.037 0.948 363 
       
Financial Activity  Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 0.203 0.190 0.019 0.869 363 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof)  0.237 0.279 0.019 1.739 363 
       
Financial Size  Financial Size (Dbacba) 0.720 0.233 0.085 1.350 363 
       
Financial Openness De jure (KAOPEN)  -0.505 1.278 -1.843 2.477 392 
De facto (FDI) 2.777 4.252 -8.629 36.114 346 
       
Trade Openness Trade  68.687 29.967 21.574 187.68 401 
Exports  30.245 14.618 5.820 69.032 401 
       
Institutional & 
Political Openness 
Institutional Index (Instidex) 0.088 2.152 -4.569 5.233 320 
Democracy   3.263 3.959 -8.000 10.000 224 
       
Other Openness  Freedom to Trade  6.060 0.917 3.400 8.100 250 
Economic Freedom   6.118 0.632 4.710 7.820 250 
       
 
 
Control Variables  
 
 
Inflation 7.239 9.496 -100.00 46.561 395 
Government Expenditure 4.304 10.670 -34.882 61.364 298 
Human Development 1.913 8.0128 0.204 47.486 341 
Economic Prosperity  4.273 3.710 -16.740 27.462 420 
Foreign Aid 9.447 8.946 -0.251 54.785 392 
Domestic Investment  19.227 9.370 -23.763 76.693 216 
Population growth  2.275 0.741 0.042 4.146 420 
       
Panel B: Presentation of Countries (28) 
Botswana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central 
African Republic. 
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
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Appendix 2: Definitions of variables  
Variables Signs Definitions of variables  Sources 
    
Financial Dependent Variables 
    
Financial  system Depth  M2 Money Supply (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Banking System Depth  Fdgdp  Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Banking System Activity  Pcrb Private domestic credit by deposit banks (% of GDP) FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Financial System Activity  Pcrbof Private domestic credit by deposit banks and other financial 
institutions (% of GDP) 
FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Financial System Size  Dbacba Deposit bank assets on (Deposit bank assets plus Central bank assets) FDSD (World Bank) 
    
Independent Openness Variables  
    
Financial Openness 1 KAOPEN De Jure Capital Openness Chinn & Ito (2002) 
    
Financial Openness 2 FDI  Foregin Direct Investment (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Openness 1  Trade Imports + Exports of Commodities (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Openness 2  Export Exports of Good & Services (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Institutional Openness  Instidex 1st Principal Component of: RL; RQ; CC;V&A; PS; GE P.C Analysis  
    
Political Openness  Demo Institutionalized Democracy (Estimate) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Freedom  TFree Freedom of Trade Index  Gwartney et al. (2011). 
Economic Freedom 
Dataset 
   
Economic Freedom  EcoFree Economic Freedom Index  
   
Control Variables  
    
Inflation  Inflation Consumer Price Index (Annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Government Expenditure GE Government Final Expenditure (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Human Development  IHDI Inequality adjusted Human Development Index WDI (World Bank) 
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Foreign-Aid  NODA Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Domestic Investment  D.I Gross Domestic Investment (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Population Growth  Popg Population Growth Rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure 
Database.  PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law.  RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption-Control. V&A: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political 
Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness.  
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